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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
delegation of legislative power because of the construction placed on this
statute by the Court in Town of Waterford v. Water Pollution Control Board.67
ACT II
In implementing the Water Pollution Control Act,58 the function of the
Water Pollution Control Board is to classify the waters of the state "in accordance with considerations of best usage in the interest of the public" and
to encourage "the most appropriate use of the lands bordering the waters for
residential and industrial purposes." 59
In Town of Waterford v. Water Pollution Control Board,60 the Town
challenged the classification made by the Board because the Board failed to
consider the fiscal and economic aspects of its classification. The contention of
the Town was that by not considering these factors the Board did not determine
the issue of whether or not the assigned classification was "in the interest of
the public."
The Court of Appeals upheld the Appellate Division's affirmance of the
Board's classification. 6 The basis for this holding is found in the modus
operandi of the Board. The procedtire is to first classify the waters and
then evolve a comprehensive program for their treatment. The Court, after
looking at the language of the statute, concluded that the time to consider
fiscal issues was when the plan was submitted to the town and not at the
time of classification. Under Section 1224 of the statute, 62 if it is shown that the
town is financially unable to construct the necessary improvements, the Board
shall withhold enforcement for up to five years. It may grant further indefinite
extensions beyond the five year stay if at a public hearing, a showing of diligent
effort to comply is made. The Court indicated that this was an express recognition in the statute of the fiscal problems involved and of the conflict between
63
costs and public policy.
Judge Van Voorhis dissented in a lengthy opinion which evidenced his
feeling that many administrative agencies tend to act as independent units,
unmindful, and often unconcerned about other branches and problems of
government. He argued that the granting of extensions for compliance with the
prescribed standards of purity is not a substitute for the consideration by the
Board of fiscal questions at the time of classification. Furthermore, the Board
need not be controlled by such considerations but that they may not comCONSTITUTIONALITY OF WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

5 N.Y.2d 171, 182 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1959). See Note, 9 BmrA.o L. REv. 83, infra.
58. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAws §§ 1200-1263.
59. Id. § 1209(2), (3)(b).
60. 5 N.Y.2d 171, 182 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1959).
61. 4 A.D.2d 415, 164 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1957).
62. Supra note 58 § 1224.
63. . .. the Legislature was aware that a comprehensive water purification
program would impose a financial burden on municipalities, but by
enacting the Water Pollution Control Act, determined that the pressing
need for water purification outweighed any financial hardship incident
thereto.
Town of Waterford v. Water Pollution Control Board, supra note 60 at 180, 182 N.Y.S.2d
791.
57.
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pletely ignore them. The procedure as approved by the majority would, he
indicated, render the statute unconstitutional as an invalid delegation of legislative authority. If the Legislature were itself classifying this same segment
of water and in so doing, certified that it had not considered fiscal problems,
the classification could not stand. In effect this would be judging without
considering all relevant factors. Thus, he concluded that the Legislature cannot
delegate authority to a board to make a judgment which it cannot itself make.
This case was one of first impression and it was resolved on the basis of
statutory interpretation. The majority and the minority both looked at the
language of Section 1209 and arrived at opposite conclusions. They agreed that
the regulation of water pollution is within the state's police power but the
majority was controlled by the practical aspects of the situation. The Water
Pollution Control Board is confronted with the complex problem of classifying all the waters of the State. These classifications are adopted only after
public hearings at which interested parties may present evidence bearing on
the classifications.6 4 If the Board is required to consider fiscal questions at
these hearings, it would be confronted with a barrage of documents relative to
the financial ability of the municipal units of the State. Such a procedure
would frustrate the operation of the Board.
VALIDITY OF AMENDED ZONING CLASSIFICATION
The New York Village Law authorizes village trustees to classify property
within their boundaries so as "to regulate and restrict ...the percentage of
lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the
density of population ....,"6 These regulations are to be "made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the district and
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the
value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout
such municipality."66 There is no question that such a grant of general
authority is constitutional if it is exercised in the interest of public health,
67
safety, morals, or general welfare.
68
In Levitt v. Sands Point petitioner claimed that an amendment to local
zoning regulations raising the minimum lot area for single family detached
dwellings from one to two acres was unconstitutional in that it was unreasonable
as it related to the property in question, and that it deprived him of property
without compensation and due process of law because it depreciated his
property value. The Supreme Court had entered judgment on a decision
by a Referee that the ordinance in question was unconstitutional; the Appellate
Division reversed; 6 9 and the Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal.
64. Supra note 58 § 1208(3), (9)(b).
65. N.Y. VLLAGn LAW § 175.

66. Id. § 177.
67.
277 U.S.
68.
69.

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See Nectow v. Cambridge,
183 (1928); Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
6 N.Y.2d 269, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959).
6 A.D.2d 701, 174 N.Y.S.2d 283 (2d Dep't 1958).

84

